Iran War: From the disORIENTation to the de-WESTERNisation of the world

Anthony Trad, Geopolitical Analyst and Chairman of Stradegy Advisory

For over 20 years, the GEAB has been studying the transition from a relatively simple Western-centred world – characterised by the absolute technological, cultural, political, financial and economic superiority of a historically coherent alliance of actors (‘the West’) over the rest of the world – to a complex (multipolar) world – comprising a diversity of major players in relative technological equilibrium and possessing sovereign strategic assets. This diversification of major players has implications not only for international institutions and governance superstructures. All commercial and financial infrastructures, as well as the operating modes of all flows traversing the planet, are being changed. Unfortunately, reforming these mechanisms is proving more difficult than one might have hoped. And only major systemic shocks seem capable of breaking down the old system to allow the new one to emerge.

Such was the case with the Covid crisis, which, by bringing global economy to a standstill, allowed new routes to open up, breaking the West’s star-shaped supply network. The war in Ukraine, by creating a barrier of fire on the routes to the west for Russian gas and oil, is enabling all Russian energy flows to be redirected eastwards and southwards (to China and India in particular). The Israel-Iran conflict, meanwhile, is putting into perspective the centrality of the Middle East in terms of hydrocarbons and that of the Strait of Hormuz as the only route to a multipolar world hungry for energy: diversification will be essential… and, as a result, we must take a new step towards ‘de-simplifying’ the global system, which is vital to restoring its stability.

In fact, of the 80-90% of trade that passes through the oceans, at least two-thirds passes through seven ‘choke points’ whose combined width is no greater than the distance between Paris and Brussels[5].

Hormuz: 34 km. Malacca: 2.7 km. Bab el-Mandeb: 29 km. Suez Canal: 300 m. Bosphorus: 700 m. Panama: 33 m. Taiwan Strait: 130 km[6].

Wars will break out at each of these points if nothing changes, given how much global flows in the multipolar world have increased and how much pressure these points are under. The solution? Finding alternative routes.

We are witnessing the simultaneous emergence of two structural shifts: a “disORIENTation” of the world (in Amin Maalouf’s sense[7]) through a forced weaning off Gulf hydrocarbons, which is pushing states and markets to reorient their energy dependencies towards other regions; and an accelerated “de-Westernisation”, fuelled by growing mistrust in America’s ability to guarantee global stability.

BRICS/BRICS+ logic, the big winner of the war in Iran

The media spotlight, still focused exclusively on the United States, concludes that American hegemony in oil and gas is being reinforced[8]. The country is indeed taking advantage of the blockage of Hormuz to increase its LNG exports to Europe (+20%[9]) and Asia (+175% increase in April[10]), which are forced to buy at inflated prices.

However, whilst these facts are true, we believe that it is the BRICS approach that is gaining significant momentum in the context of the Middle East crisis.

By 2026, the BRICS+ will account for nearly half the world’s population and around 40% of global GDP in purchasing power parity, following the integration of nine new partner states in January 2025, including Indonesia, which brings to the bloc the world’s fourth-largest population, the leading economy in South-East Asia (which will encourage others to join), the world’s largest Muslim-majority country and a highly strategic maritime chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific[11].

Their inability to issue a joint statement when the Iranian member is bombed[12] says everything about what they are: not a military alliance, but a platform for circumvention, allowing each to reduce its dependence on US sanctions, the dollar and the diplomatic hierarchies inherited from the 20th century. The war in Iran offers them an unexpected acceleration.

China is the perfect illustration of the winner without a uniform. It is losing access to Iranian oil transported via shadow channels (15% of its total imports[13]) but is gaining on all other fronts: co-signatory of the peace plan with Pakistan, guarantor of the safety of Iranian delegates in Islamabad, 25% shareholder in Guyanese oil which is replacing Gulf crude in Asia whilst the Strait of Hormuz is closed[14], and co-architect of a Power of Siberia 2[15], first mentioned in China’s five-year plan of March 2026[16].

Russia, meanwhile, is reaping the benefits effortlessly. The price of Urals crude has risen from under $55 before the war to around $115 in March, representing nearly $9 billion in additional revenue per month[17].

Every day the Strait of Hormuz remains closed strengthens its position as an alternative supplier. Exports to India have doubled[18]. India, which imports 60% of its crude oil and 40% of its urea and phosphate from the Middle East (and is highly exposed to the war in Iran via its 10 million workers in the Gulf generating $125 billion in annual remittances[19]), is attempting to secure long-term Russian oil contracts in rupees, yuan or dirhams[20]. In fact, this war is pushing New Delhi, the country most affected outside the MENA region, towards a pragmatic de-dollarisation that would never be politically accepted under normal circumstances. And Trump, caught between his sanctions and the need to avoid an electoral backlash, has had to grant two waivers to US sanctions on Russian oil[21]. Will we see a third month of waivers put in place? The answer will come on 16 May, the expiry date of the latest extension[22]. India is getting nervous in any case[23].

Everything suggests that Russia will use this oil windfall (March–September 2026) to replenish its foreign exchange reserves and launch a new offensive in Ukraine before winter, taking advantage of the West’s distraction and the slowdown in arms deliveries to Kyiv, which are themselves held up by the backlog of orders linked to the Iranian conflict. Two wars. One winner.

Who benefits most from this war? Moscow. Who is securing the easing of sanctions on its oil? Moscow. Who is seeing its exports to India and China skyrocket? Moscow again. The legend of Russian influence over Trump has never seemed so well supported by the facts. But above all, the BRICS club has never made so much sense to its members.

Pakistan: Master of a new ‘Sunni NATO’?

Islamabad has been seeking to join the BRICS for several years, but its entry has so far been blocked by India. In the new world order, nothing is as certain as it once was.

Backed by Beijing via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC[24]), useful to Riyadh as well as to Ankara and Cairo (the four countries are organising themselves into a regional bloc in the context of the war in Iran[25]), capable of engaging with Tehran for the past twenty years, a historic security partner of the United States and the only Muslim nuclear power, Pakistan has become too central to be ignored. It is now the only actor capable of holding these four strands together. In the longer term, Islamabad could extend its role as a security guarantor to the other Gulf states.

Acting both as a conduit for the ‘Global South’ and a major Muslim voice (home to the world’s second-largest Muslim population, with 240 million followers), Pakistan has gone from being a near-failed state in 2023 (with $44 billion in debt to the IMF) to a negotiator of a ceasefire between Iran and the United States that is still awaited. It has, moreover, just received IMF approval for a loan of USD 1.32 billion[26], a welcome lifeline. By the end of 2027, Islamabad could secure a second debt relief package from the IMF and preferential access to the US market for its textile and agricultural exports.

But this trajectory must not obscure a harsher reality. With debt exceeding 70% of its GDP[27], its neutrality is dictated by necessity. Paradoxically, it is this fragility that strengthens its diplomatic value (a Pakistan too powerful would no longer be accepted by all as a mediator).

China now supplies 82% of Pakistan’s arms imports (compared with 50% ten years ago)[28], having proven its effectiveness against India during Operation Sindoor in May 2025[29]. We anticipate that Pakistan will no longer be merely a customer but a co-developer and exporter of arms to the Islamic world – a position already illustrated by the USD 4.6 billion contract signed between China and Azerbaijan for fighter jets[30].

This is a direction that Turkey covets but which the Pakistan-China convergence is currently challenging.

We believe that by 2027 Pakistan will secure enhanced status as a BRICS+ strategic partner, the first step towards full membership should the balance of power with India ease or should China impose it. Its emergence on the international stage is, in any case, a further indication that the ‘BRICS logic’ of multipolarisation is gaining strength amidst the Middle East crisis.

Crisis at the heart of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

On 29 April 2026, the United Arab Emirates announced its withdrawal from OPEC, effective 1 May, whilst Gulf exporters were no longer able to ship a single barrel via Hormuz[31]. And with good reason: Abu Dhabi, the cartel’s third-largest producer, had invested USD 150 billion to boost its capacity to 4.85 million barrels per day, but remained constrained by the OPEC+ quota of 3.4 million, leaving 30% of its capacity unused whilst Iraq and Russia cheated with impunity on their own production caps[32].

The end of OPEC? We believe this departure will trigger a phase of gradual disintegration of the cartel, weakening its ability to control markets and paving the way for increased competition between producers. With the UAE gone, that’s 15% lost. Sharp price falls are to be expected. OPEC will revert to being a political forum rather than an effective cartel.

On paper, Abu Dhabi says it wants to produce at full capacity and sell without restriction. We believe that, beyond the unprecedented cost of the Iranian attacks, the Emirates have no intention whatsoever of remaining in a cartel where Tehran still holds a seat, given that they intend to ship more oil directly to Israel, which has become their number one strategic ally since the signing of the 2020 agreement for the export of their oil to Europe[33]. Ultimately, this withdrawal from OPEC is the most direct evidence of the Emirates’ irreversible choice: Israel rather than Saudi Arabia[34].

To understand this tipping point, one must trace the roots of a long-standing rift. Riyadh has gradually seen its neighbour provide proxy support to actors whose objectives clashed directly with its own priorities: Libya, Sudan, the Horn of Africa… but Yemen proved to be the last straw. Emirati support for southern separatist forces has undermined Riyadh’s objective of restoring a unified Yemeni state under its auspices[35]. Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who once saw Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan (MBZ) as a mentor, now regards him as a rival. The two men are too different ideologically and geopolitically; it was bound to come to a head sooner or later. The war in Iran will merely be the trigger. In future, the UAE and Saudi Arabia will each seek to build their own spheres of influence in the Arab world. And the GCC will never be the same bloc again. But who is the winner in this split?

War does not merely destroy bases and lives. It destroys a narrative. The Emirates spent 30 years tirelessly promoting a vision of the Middle East: security, modernity and abundance. It took just a few weeks for this golden era to shatter. The Dubai index has fallen by 20% since 28 February[36]. Goldman Sachs expects property transactions to fall by 37% year-on-year and 49% month-on-month, with discounts of 15% on certain properties in Palm Jumeirah[37]. We anticipate that this crisis of confidence will take longer to overcome than the physical damage itself, and that the capital and talent that have left since February will not return until an entire generation has forgotten March 2026. Following the resumption of Iranian strikes on 4 May[38], we cannot rule out Abu Dhabi taking the step of launching a direct retaliation against Tehran – a symbolic move, but one that risks exacerbating the haemorrhage it is seeking to stem.

For the first time, Iran has attacked all six GCC members simultaneously, sending a clear message: any country that has hosted a US command is a legitimate target[39]. The Gulf states are simultaneously angry with Iran for striking them and with the US, whose presence was supposed to be a guarantee. Relations between the GCC and the United States are at breaking point: the ‘Freedom Initiative’ to escort merchant ships through the Persian Gulf has just been cut short after Riyadh and Kuwait City banned US aircraft from using or flying over their bases and territories[40] … The Saudi-US relationship risks entering a transactional phase of unprecedented severity.

Riyadh will not normalise relations with Israel, at least not whilst Netanyahu remains in power and no visible concessions have been made regarding Gaza, seeking instead to re-establish itself as the political centre of the Arab world by funding the reconstruction of Gaza – a role neither a weakened Iran nor a Qatar under pressure will be able to fulfil as lead donors. Gaza is becoming the arena where MBS can regain pan-Arab legitimacy. And to cement this position, Saudi Arabia could dust off a forty-year-old project – its 1,200 km East-West pipeline to the Red Sea to bypass Hormuz[41] … a pipeline that Saddam Hussein once forced Riyadh to shut down in 1990[42]. History, sometimes, offers second chances.

We anticipate that Saudi Arabia will formalise its membership of the BRICS by 2028. Having been invited since 2023 and having pulled out at the last minute in 2025, Riyadh has maintained a wait-and-see stance[43]. The entry of the world’s largest oil producer into the 21st-century club of non-aligned nations, likely drawing Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar in its wake, will mark a major milestone in the emergence of a multipolar world. Riyadh will not choose Beijing over Washington. It will choose never again to depend on a single protector.

Yet, there is something ironically logical about this reconfiguration of the Gulf. Qatar, which Riyadh had attempted to isolate completely for three and a half years between 2017 and 2021[44], now finds itself in the position of a necessary partner: Ras Laffan, the world’s largest gas platform, has suffered damage estimated to take five years to repair and a loss of 17% of its LNG export capacity[45]; Doha needs Saudi land corridors to bypass Hormuz and access the Red Sea; Riyadh needs Qatari diplomatic legitimacy with Tehran and the regional Muslim Brotherhood. We anticipate that some form of forced rapprochement will take place between the two countries, less out of conviction than out of mutual necessity. It is a marriage of convenience between two former enemies that the war will make inevitable.

That leaves Oman, the GCC’s great forgotten nation and big winner. The sultanate, the least affected despite its ports housing US facilities, owes this reprieve to a neutrality built on 40 years of consistent diplomacy. Oman has assets: maritime access outside Hormuz via Sohar and Salalah, and credibility with both Iran and the West[46]. We believe that Muscat will consolidate its position as the ‘Geneva of the Middle East’ over the next ten years, courted by Washington, Beijing and Tehran. Oman will capitalise on its geography as never before. Alongside Islamabad, Muscat will be one of the two key mediation hubs in the Arab world. The GCC as we have known it is a thing of the past.

A new Gulf will emerge, more divided, more distrustful, and more open to multiple external alignments. What comes next has no name yet. But it is beginning now.

As routes leave the Gulf, Africa returns to centre stage

It took just a few weeks for the maritime map to be redrawn.

Since the Houthis closed Bab el-Mandeb last year, Cape Town and Durban have seen their transit traffic and port revenues increase. The Cape of Good Hope, an alternative route since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869[47], is regaining a role it had not played for a hundred and fifty years. This detour adds 10–15 days to journeys and increases transport costs by 30–50%[48] (especially at current crude oil prices), but it offers something the Gulf can no longer guarantee: security. Up to 15% of Asia–Europe trade flows could pass through the Cape on a long-term basis, compared with less than 5% before 2023. Pretoria is reportedly negotiating with China, India and the EU on large-scale port modernisation agreements to capture this new maritime revenue stream and raise transit fees.

Twenty years ago, Mohammed VI, King of Morocco, launched Tanger Med[49]. The project seemed overly ambitious for a country of 37 million people with no maritime tradition. Today, Tanger Med is connected to 180 ports in 70 countries and handles volumes comparable to those of major European hubs[50]. And the war in Iran has just validated this vision. Morocco controls the southern flank of the Strait of Gibraltar, the only maritime passage between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic that has remained fully open since the Hormuz crisis[51].

Rabat has already planned the next steps: Nador West Med will open in late 2026 with a capacity of 5 million TEUs (Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units) and Morocco’s first LNG terminal; and Dakhla Atlantique will follow, with an opening scheduled for 2028–2029 and an annual capacity of 35 million tonnes[52]. CMA CGM has already signed an agreement guaranteeing 3 million containers per year to Nador[53]. Finally, the 5,800 km Nigeria-Morocco pipeline (the world’s longest offshore gas pipeline, if completed) could transport part of Sub-Saharan Africa’s gas to Europe via the Kingdom, completely bypassing the Gulf. Morocco has the potential to establish itself as the main energy and transit trade hub between Europe, Africa and the Americas – a role that Dubai previously held for the Middle East.

Algeria is formally identified by the IMF as one of the major winners of the Iranian conflict[54]. Italy and Spain arrived in Algiers within 24 hours of each other in March to secure gas via the Transmed (to Italy) and Medgaz (to Spain) pipelines[55]. Algeria was already supplying 39–40 billion cubic metres of gas to the EU in 2025, representing one-sixth of total imports[56], and has a window of 18 to 24 months to secure favourable terms before European renewables reduce demand.

Libya, long marginalised, is back in the game by awarding its oil and gas blocks to foreign majors (Eni, Chevron, QatarEnergy), a first in twenty years. When necessity is the mother of invention, Europeans know how to forget. The pipeline from the Farigh field to the Mediterranean was in the testing phase in early March. We anticipate that this pipeline will soon be in commercial operation, making Libya Europe’s third-largest gas supplier. Once again, the war in Iran will be the catalyst for Euro-African energy integration that twenty years of the European Neighbourhood Policy had failed to achieve.

New European champions?

The third energy crisis in four years, and Europe still hasn’t learnt from its mistakes.

In 2022, it was 40% dependent on Russian gas and had no exit strategy. By 2026, it is rushing to turn to US LNG, which now accounts for 64% of its imports[57]. US contracts are indexed to the Henry Hub – a price it has no control over – and can be redirected to Asian buyers at any time. In March, the closure of Ras Laffan sent the TTF[58] soaring above €60/MWh, with reserves falling to 30%, a five-year low[59]. Europe has replaced one dependency with another, without addressing its vulnerability to external shocks. It has no Plan B for Hormuz, just as it had no Plan B for Russian gas in 2022. The problem is no longer cyclical; it is structural.

This crisis also reveals an internal divide. Whilst in Spain in 2026, gas determines the price of electricity for only 15% of the time thanks to the rapid rise of renewables, in Italy this figure reaches 90%[60]. The same external shock, two economic realities. Italy and Germany, where steel and chemical manufacturers have imposed 30% surcharges on their customers, are on the brink of a technical recession. In 2022, the war in Ukraine triggered an unprecedented wave of investment in European renewables. Countries that reach 50% renewables in their energy mix will be immune to the next Hormuz shock. Currently, only a few economies are on this positive trajectory: Spain, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden and Scotland.

Now, a little optimism… and some ideas! Portugal has the longest Atlantic coastline in continental Europe, whilst Spain has the continent’s largest regasification capacity at 34 billion cubic metres per year[61] – but is connected to France by only two small, saturated gas pipelines.

This is the most absurd missing link in Europe’s energy geography. If the EU funds the Iberian interconnection by 2028, it will create a shared Atlantic LNG terminal capable of supplying Germany and Italy without having to use eastern routes or rely on the Gulf. We anticipate that by 2030, the Lisbon-Madrid-Bilbao Iberian corridor will become Europe’s main energy gateway from the Atlantic, dethroning Rotterdam and Zeebrugge. The war in Iran will have cost Europe hundreds of billions. The Iberian interconnection would probably cost only five.

What this war tells us about the next one

The history of wars is also the history of what they reveal.

A few dozen kilometres of strait were enough to shake the global economic machine. A country bled dry held the world’s leading military power hostage. What is certain is that the initial miscalculation—the idea that decapitating a regime is enough to bring it down—will haunt Washington and Tel Aviv for many years to come. Meanwhile, Russia was waiting for prices to rise. China let its dependencies speak out. Sun Tzu wrote long ago that ‘the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting’. What this war teaches us is not that dependencies are dangerous. It is that we continue, generation after generation, to replace old dependencies with new ones before we have even understood the previous ones.

The next one is called Artificial Intelligence. Our infrastructure is already connected to it, our financial markets depend on it, our armed forces are integrating it, our children are learning it. But, to ensure it does not become yet another dependency, perhaps we must now stop seeing it as a threat, but rather as a compass in the complex world to come.

For the first time in history, a tool is capable of seeing what the human eye can no longer see: cross-referencing millions of data points in real time, modelling invisible chains, anticipating systemic breakdowns that no state can any longer comprehend on its own.

The real question, then, is perhaps no longer who will dominate the world of tomorrow, but whether we will have the political wisdom to use these new tools to manage this infinitely complex world by anticipating the next shocks.

Ultimately, this Iran-US conflict leaves us not so much with a map of the post-pandemic world as an invitation to draw the next one...

FOOTNOTES

[5] Source: Anadolu Agency, 10/03/2026

[6] Source: Logistics Middle East, 13/04/2026

[7] Source: Amin Maalouf, Les Désorientés, 2012

[8] Source: El País, 8/05/2026

[9] Source: US fuel exports hit record high, a boon for oil companies and a threat to Trump, Financial Times, 6/05/2026

[10] Source: BOE Report, 1/05/2026

[11] Source: Le Grand Continent, 2/01/2025

[12] Source: Foreign Policy, 16/03/2026

[13] Source: Les Echos, 13/04/2026

[14] Sources: EIA, 17/12/2025 and Al Jazeera, 12/05/2026

[15] Source: CryptoBriefing, 9/05/2026

[16] Source: China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, IISS, 23/03/2026

[17] Source: Reuters, 27/04/2026

[18] Source: BFM TV, 27/04/2026

[19] Source: BFM TV, 2/03/2026

[20] Source: Guru, 28/03/2026

[21] Source: Euronews, 13/03/2026

[22] Source: Visionas.in, 11/05/2026

[23] Source: OilPrice, 14/05/2026

[24] Source: Eurasia Review, 10/05/2026

[25] Source: The Conversation, 8/04/2026

[26] Source: TMV.in, 9/05/2026

[27] Source: Directorate-General of the Treasury, 2026

[28] Source: Arms Observatory, 8/03/2026

[29] Source: Organiser, 11/05/2026

[30] Source: Avianews, 9/06/2025

[31] Source: Al Jazeera, 29/04/2026

[32] Source: TV5 Monde, 29/04/2026

[33] Source: The Washington Institute, 3/05/2021

[34] Source: L'Orient-Le-Jour, 30/12/2025

[35] Source: RFI, 27/12/2025

[36] Source: Agefi, 16/03/2026

[37] Sources: Reuters, 3/03/2026 and Goldman Sachs, 23/03/2026

[38] Source: Les Echos, 5/05/2026

[39] Source: France Info, 10/03/2026

[40] Source: Today, 9/05/2026

[41] Source: Arab News, 1/04/2026

[42] Source: L'Opinion, 16/03/2026

[43] Source: Geoconfluences, 4/12/2025

[44] Source: Le Monde, 5/01/2021

[45] Source: Les Echos, 1/03/2026

[46] Source: Le Temps, 3/05/2026

[47] Source: National Geographic, 19/06/2025

[48] Source: Van Report, 9/01/2025

[49] Source: Hespress, 9/06/2025

[50] Source: North Africa Post, 13/03/2026

[51] Source: Atalayar, 2/04/2026

[52] Source: Reuters, 8/12/2025

[53] Source: Medias 24, 11/11/2025

[54] Source: Arabian Gulf Business Insight, 22/04/2026

[55] Source: La Croix, 2/04/2026

[56] Source: Opera énergie, 26/03/2026

[57] Source: National Interest, 7/04/2026

[58] Located virtually in the Netherlands, the TTF (Title Transfer Facility) is the benchmark market for natural gas in Europe.

[59] Source: Wikipedia, 28/04/2026

[60] Source: PV Magazine, 18/03/2026

[61] Source: Conflits magazine, 22/04/2026